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“The principles . . . affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They . . . apply 
to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home 
and the privacies of life.  It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, 
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”1
“And what, other than civil suit, is the “effective deterrent” of a police [officer’s] violation of an 
already-confessed suspect's Sixth Amendment rights by denying him prompt access to counsel? 
Many would regard these violated rights as more significant than the right not to be intruded 
upon in one's nightclothes . . .”2
Introduction 
 
On July 1, 2005, the head marshal of the Supreme Court, Pamela Talkin, hand-delivered 
a letter to the White House, a letter which contained just three sentences: 3 “Dear President 
Bush:  This is to inform you of my decision to retire from my position as an associate justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States effective upon the nomination and confirmation of my 
successor. It has been a great privilege, indeed, to have served as a member of the court for 24 
terms. I will leave it with enormous respect for the integrity of the court and its role under our 
 
* The author currently practices at Latham & Watkins, LLP, in New York.  I would like to thank all those who 
contributed ideas and advice, especially Eric Waldo, currently serving as clerk to Judge Ann Aldrich of the Northern 
District of Ohio.  All errors are my own. 
1 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (Bradley, J.). 
2 Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (2006) (Scalia, J.).  
3 Richard W. Stevenson and Linda Greenhouse, “O'Connor, First Woman on High Court, Resigns After 24 
Years,”  The Washington Post, July 1, 2005 at A1.   
2constitutional structure.  Sincerely, Sandra Day O'Connor.”4 And just like that, the career of the 
first woman ever appointed to the Supreme Court came to a close.  
 It would be almost six months before Justice O’Connor actually left the Court.5 And yet, 
within a matter of weeks of her departure, the Supreme Court would embark upon an 
extraordinary process of curtailing generally accepted Fourth Amendment protections that 
Justice O’Connor would almost surely have questioned, and in one case prevented.  In Samson v. 
California,6 decided just weeks after Justice O’Connor left, the Court determined that parolees 
may be subjected to warrantless, suspicionless searches of their person and property, by any 
government official, at any time.7 This 6-3 decision marked yet another chapter in the Court’s 
recent history of declaring entire groups of individuals almost completely unprotected by the 
Fourth Amendment.  In Hudson v. Michigan8 - in what was a surprise to almost every observer - 
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not mandate exclusion of evidence discovered 
following knock-and-announce violations.9 What was most surprising about the Court’s decision 
in Hudson was the majority’s willingness to call into question the central role of the exclusionary 
rule to Fourth Amendment analysis. Coming in a 5-4 decision that was re-argued after Justice 
O’Connor left the Court, Justice Alito, O’Connor’s replacement on the Court, supplied the 
crucial fifth vote for the majority that O’Connor most probably would have withheld.10 And just 
 
4 Text of the letter taken from Nina Totenberg, “Justice Sandra Day O’Connor Retires,” available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4726127 (last accessed January 31, 2007).  Following his 
receipt of the letter, Mr. Bush held a brief phone conversation with Justice O'Connor , telling her, "For an old 
ranching girl, you turned out pretty good," a reference to her roots in El Paso, Texas.  Stevenson, supra n.3. 
5 Following Justice O’Connor’s announcement, her intended replacement, John Roberts, was nominated for 
Chief Justice following William Rehnquist’s death.  Samuel Alito was then nominated as Justice O’Connor’s 
successor, and was confirmed on January 30, 2006.  David Stout, “Alito Is Sworn In as Justice After 58-42 Vote to 
Confirm Him,”  The New York Times, January 31, 2006, at A1. 
6 Samson v. California,  126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006). 
7 Id. at 2202. 
8 Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2159 (2006 
9 Id. at 2168. 
10 It appears likely from statements made in the first oral argument in Hudson that Justice O’Connor probably 
would have voted to apply the exclusionary rule; see n.95-96, infra.
3like that, the continued vitality of one of the most well-established tenants of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence – the  exclusionary rule – was back in play almost a century after it was 
established.11 
Looking back at the 2005-2006 term, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky quipped that it was a 
“mixed year” for criminal defendants.12 On the contrary, 2006 was actually quite a bad year -  
not only for criminal defendants, but for anyone concerned with the steady tilt of the high court 
away from a robust interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  Along with creating yet another 
categorical exclusion of an entire class of individuals from meaningful Fourth Amendment 
protection (that being parolees in Samson), 2006 inaugurated what promises to be a years-long 
struggle within the Court for one of the core tenants of modern Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence:  the exclusionary rule.  More fundamentally, the first wave of Fourth Amendment 
cases indicated clearly the Roberts Court’s thinking vis-à-vis the balance between personal 
privacy and government power through law enforcement. 
______________________________________________ 
 
In this article, I critique the change in course in criminal procedure chartered by the 
Roberts Court in these decisions.  In Part I, I will examine the Court’s decision in Samson,
arguing that the majority’s decision rests on unsupportable conceptions of efficacy of 
suspicionless searches and role they play in effectuating the penological and rehabilitative goals 
of parole. While few would argue that Samson is a particularly groundbreaking decision, it is 
nonetheless notable for its overly broad conception of Fourth Amendment “reasonableness.”   In 
 
11 The exclusionary rule was first announced by the Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) 
(holding that evidence seized by federal officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from trial 
in federal cases).  The rule was held applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
12 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court, 9 Greenbag 2d 335, 344 (Summer, 2006).    
4Part II, I will examine the Court’s opening salvo against the exclusionary rule in Hudson. I
assert that Hudson was the first shot across the bow in what promises to be a long campaign by 
the “conservative” block of the Court 13 to undermine, and ultimately overrule, the exclusionary 
rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.  In Part III,  I will argue that the Court’s 
decisions in these cases show a clear preference in the Court’s jurisprudence for the 
government’s prerogatives in law enforcement, to the determinant of individuals’ legitimate 
expectations of privacy, dignity, and autonomy.  Both Samson and Hudson offer tantalizing clues 
as to the new Roberts Court’s general theory of the balance of power, if you will, between the 
state and the individual; a theory which promises to carry over into the “new generation” of 
Fourth Amendment cases soon to come before the court. 
 
13 By referencing the “conservative” block of the Court (which includes Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Chief 
Justice Roberts, and sometimes Justice Kennedy), I make no representation as to whether these jurists are in any 
way “conservative,” as the term is commonly used.  I seek not to lump these Justices into umbrella political 
categories that may or may not be a perfect fit.  However, I think that at this point the nomenclature “conservative 
block” has gained much traction when describing this group of justices, and for ease of language, I will occasionally 
use this term, as well as the term “liberal block,” as a short-hand descriptor.  A good justification for the use of this 
terminology was provided by Professor Kerr:  
 My sense is that we tend to apply terms like "liberal" and "conservative" to individual Justices by looking 
 at those cases and asking if Justice X's votes consistently try to pull the law to the left or the right compared 
 to a world in which the Court took no cases. If a Justice consistently votes to pull the law to the right, we 
 label that Justice a conservative; if a Justice consistently votes to pull the law to the left, we label that 
 Justice a liberal; and if a Justice's votes reveal no consistent patterns, we label that Justice a moderate. 
 What this means, I think, is that calling someone a "conservative Justice" does not mean that the Justice is 
 conservative politically or votes for Republicans. Conversely, calling a Justice a "liberal" does not mean 
 that the Justice is liberal politically or votes for Democrats. In the case of Supreme Court Justices, the label 
 is just a shorthand signaling that the Justice's votes tend to have the effect of pushing the law in a direction 
 that favors the policy preferences on one side or the other. Thus, we might find a Justice shifting from 
 being a liberal to a conservative even if the Justice's views don't change. A good example is Justice 
 Frankfurter, who was considered a liberal in the 1930s but a conservative in the 1950s in part because the 
 political valence of judicial restraint had shifted.” 
Orin S. Kerr., posting on The Volokh Conspiracy Nov. 14, 2006, available at 
http://volokh.com/posts/1163447802.shtml.  Last accessed Nov. 20, 2006. 
5I.  Categorical Exclusion of Parolees from Fourth Amendment Protection:   
Samson v. California  
 
A.  Background – Probationer’s Rights Under the Fourth Amendment 
 In Samson v. California, 14 the Court held, 6-3, that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee. 15 The Court’s 
decision in Samson was not a total surprise; the groundwork for the case had been laid just five 
years earlier in United States v. Knights, where the Court endorsed a search regime for 
probationers that required only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to search.  
 1. United States v. Knights 
 The conceptual basis for the Court’s holding in Samson lies in United States v. Knights.16 
In Knights, the Court upheld a California law providing that individuals on probation could be 
stopped and searched at any time during the probationary period upon reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, as opposed to the usual requirement of probable cause.17 The Court found that 
such searches were “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.   
 Writing for a unanimous Court,18 Chief Justice Rehnquist held that probation was merely 
one stop along a “continuum” of possible punishments facing a convicted criminal ranging from 
“solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community 
service.”19 The Court used a privacy/governmental interest balancing test to assess the 
reasonableness of the reduced-suspicion search.  The Court found first that probationers, based 
 
14 Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2194 (2006).   
15 Id. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, Justice 
Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Scalia.  Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens dissented.  
16 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).   
17 Id. at 123.  
18 Justice Souter filed a one-paragraph concurrence dealing with a secondary issue in the case.  Knights, 534 
U.S. at 122-23 (Souter, J., concurring).   
19 Id. at 119, quoting Griffin v. Wisconson, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (Scalia, J.).  
6on their position on the “continuum,” had a lowered expectation of privacy.  Next, the Court held 
that it is “reasonable to conclude” that allowing searches of probationers on less than probable 
cause of criminal activity would “further the two primary goals of probation - rehabilitation and 
protecting society from future criminal violations.”20 As such, it is reasonable to subject 
probationers to searches, and those searches need not be supported by probable cause (or a 
warrant) like “typical” searches under the Fourth Amendment.  Indeed, the Court specified that 
the officer need not be that particular individual’s probation officer; rather, any officer with 
knowledge of the individual’s status as a probationer could search without suspicion.21 
Perhaps the most notable aspect of Knights was the Court’s holding that it did not need to 
resort to “special needs” analysis to justify suspicionless searches of probationers.  In Griffin v. 
Wisconson,22 decided seven years prior to Knights, the Court held that warrantless searches of a 
probationer’s home were permissible; the doctrinal hook, so to speak, was that the state law 
authorizing the search fulfilled the “special need” of monitoring probationers.23 “Special needs” 
was, by the time Griffin was decided, a well-established exception to the general 
warrant/probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.24 Under Knights, however, the 
Court abandoned the requirement of “special needs,”25 and held that a “general” Fourth 
 
20 Id. 
21 Id.  
22 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987). 
23 Id. at 876.   
24 Griffin was also the case in which Justice Scalia first applied the “continuum” theory of criminal punishment 
– a concept that would be instrumental in the Court’s opinion in Knights and Samson. (“Probation is simply one 
point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary 
confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service. A number of different 
options lie between those extremes, including confinement in a medium- or minimum-security facility, work-release 
programs, "halfway houses," and probation -- which can itself be more or less confining depending upon the number 
and severity of restrictions imposed.”) Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.  Incidentally, one might think that this continuum 
should include capital punishment, although neither Justice Scalia nor Chief Justice Rehnquist was impolitic enough 
in their opinions to mention it. 
25 Knights, 534 U.S. at 117-118 (“In Knights' view, apparently shared by the Court of Appeals, a warrantless 
search of a probationer satisfies the Fourth Amendment only if it is just like the search at issue in Griffin- i.e., a 
“special needs” search conducted by a probation officer monitoring whether the probationer is complying with 
7Amendment reasonableness analysis was all that was needed to determine that probationers did 
not enjoy full rights under the amendment, and could be searched at any time on reasonable 
suspicion alone.26 
B. Samson v. California 
With this precedent less than five years old, the Court decided Samson v. California.27 In 
Samson, another California law mandated that every prisoner eligible for release on parole “shall 
agree in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any 
time of the day or night.”28 Individualized suspicion of wrongdoing by the parolee was not a 
prerequisite to search under the law.  The facts of the case were quite similar to Knights;
petitioner Donald Samson, on parole following a conviction for felony possession of a firearm, 
was walking down a street with a woman and child.  He was approached by a local police 
officer, who knew that Mr. Samson was on parole and believed him to be subject to an 
outstanding warrant.29 After stopping Mr. Samson and confirming that he was not subject to an 
outstanding warrant, the officer nevertheless searched Mr. Samson, based solely on Mr. 
Samson’s status as a parolee.  Of course, during the search, the officer discovered a cigarette box 
in Mr. Samson’s pocket containing methamphetamine.30 
probation restrictions. This dubious logic-that an opinion upholding the constitutionality of a particular search 
implicitly holds unconstitutional any search that is not like it-runs contrary to Griffin 's express statement that its 
“special needs” holding made it ‘unnecessary to consider whether’ warrantless searches of probationers were 
otherwise reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
26 Id. at 118-119. 
27 Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2194 (2006). 
28 Id. at 2196, citing Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067(a)(West 2000). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
8At the suppression hearing, the trial court refused Mr. Samson’s motion to suppress the 
drugs.  Citing the California law,31 the court found that the search was proper even though the 
arresting officer lacked any suspicion that Mr. Samson was engaged in criminal activity (apart 
from the fact that he was a parolee).  The jury convicted Mr. Samson, and he was sentenced to 
seven years imprisonment.32 The California Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a  
suspicionless search of a parolee is “reasonable with in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as 
long as it is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.”33 
1.  The Majority Opinion 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed.  Writing for six members of the 
Court,34 Justice Thomas began by invoking the “totality of the circumstances” test for 
determining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.  “Whether a search is reasonable is 
determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s 
privacy and, on the other hand, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.”35 Pursuant to this approach, and relying heavily on Knights, Justice 
Thomas found that, by virtue of their status as parolees on the “continuum” of state-imposed 
punishments, parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy.36 In effect, parolees fall 
somewhere between prisoners and probationers, and since neither of those groups enjoy a full 
expectation of privacy under the Court’s precedents, neither do parolees.   
 Justice Thomas then looked to the substantial governmental interests in allowing 
warrantless, suspicionless searches of parolees.  “As the [high] recidivism rate [in the state of 
 
31 Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067(a)(West 2000) (requiring parolees to “‘to be subject to search or seizure by a
parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or 
without cause.”). 
32 Id. 
33 Samson v. California, No. A102394 (Ct.App.Cal., 1st App. Dist., Oct. 14, 2004). 
34 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. 
35 Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2197 (citations omitted). 
36 Id. at 2198-99. 
9California] demonstrates, most parolees are ill prepared to handle the pressures of reintegration.  
Thus, most parolees require intense supervision.”37 This supervision, Justice Thomas asserted, 
necessarily includes being exposed to suspicionless searches.  “Imposing a reasonable suspicion 
requirement, as urged by petitioner, would give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate 
searches and conceal criminality.38 Because this would impeded the California legislature’s goal 
of promoting re-integration, suspicionless searches are a “reasonable” response, and therefore 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.39 
2.  The Dissent 
 Writing for the dissent,40 Justice Stevens focused first on the fact that the majority 
opinion marked a clear break from precedent. “What the Court sanctions today is an 
unprecedented curtailment of liberty.”41 Justice Stevens noted that in the cases most heavily 
relied on by the majority, Knights and Griffin, the Court had stopped short of sanctioning 
completely suspicionless searches of probationers (a close corollary to parolees) by any and all 
law enforcement officials. As to Griffin, Stevens noted that “at least the state in Griffin could in 
good faith contend that its warrantless searches were supported by a special needs conceptually 
distinct from law enforcement goals generally.”42 And as to Knights, Stevens noted that, under 
that decision, reasonable suspicion was required to search probationers.43 In Samson, however, 
the majority jettisons both the “special needs” requirement from Griffin and the “reasonable 
suspicion” requirement from Knights. “Ignoring just how ‘closely guarded’ is that ‘category of 
 
37 Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2200. 
38 Id. at 2200. 
39 Id.at 2202. 
40 Id. (Stevens, J., Breyer, J., and Souter, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 2203. 
43 Id. 
10
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches’ the Court for the first time upholds an 
entirely suspicionless search unsupported by any special need.”44 
Justice Stevens then addressed the majority’s determination of parolee’s lowered 
expectation of privacy.  “Combining faulty syllogism with circular reasoning, the Court 
concludes that parolees have no more legitimate expectation of privacy in their persons than do 
prisoners.  However superficially appealing that parity in treatment may seem, it . . . rests on an 
intuition that fares poorly under scrutiny.”45 Justice Stevens continued: 
 Threaded throughout the Court’s reasoning is the suggestion that 
 deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights is part and parcel of any 
 convict’s punishment.  If a person may be subject to random and 
 suspicionless searches in prison, the Court seems to assume, then 
 he cannot complain when he is subject to the same invasion 
 outside of prison, so long as the State can imprison him . . . [t]his 
 is a vestige of the long-discredited “act of grace” theory of  
 parole.46 
Justice Stevens argued that the majority short-circuited a true Fourth Amendment analysis by 
simply assuming that deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights is necessarily a component of 
criminal punishment, without turning to “special needs” analysis, which had been the Court’s 
chosen doctrinal method in Griffin, or hewing to the Court’s decision in Knights that at least 
reasonable suspicion is required to search.  
C. Critiquing Justice Thomas’ Opinion 
 1. The Court Assumes, Without Evidence or Analysis, That Suspicionless    
 Searches Deter Effective Monitoring of Parolees. 
44 Id. at 2204, citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).   
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 2206. 
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The majority’s opinion in Samson is less than compelling.  To begin, Justice Thomas 
never adequately explains why requiring government officials to have individualized, objectively 
reasonable suspicion before searching a parolee would handicap the government’s penological 
and rehabilitative interests.  While he asserts, uncontroversially, that “a State has an 
overwhelming interest in supervising parolees” and that the “a State’s interest in reducing 
recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship . . . warrant[s] a privacy 
intrusion that would otherwise not be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment,”47 he fails to 
explain, or point to any evidence beyond the California legislatures’ passing of the law, why 
requiring government officials to be able to point to at least some objective suspicion of 
wrongdoing by the parolee would hinder these objectives.   
 While Justice Thomas is no doubt correct to assert that the legislature, not the courts, are 
the appropriate forum for determining the “wisdom” of a particular policy (such as the need to 
subject parolees to intense supervision), it is nevertheless inherent in the nature of the “totality of 
the circumstances” inquiry for the Court to determine whether the legislature’s chosen method of 
effectuating its policy choice is consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s command of 
“reasonableness.”  This means that the Court must make an attempt to determine whether the 
methods chosen by the legislature (in this case, authorizing suspicionless searches) serve a 
constitutionally permissible end (that all searches be “reasonable”).  Simply stating that the 
legislature has determined that “a requirement that searches be based on individualized suspicion 
would undermine the State’s ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect the public”48 is 
of no help when facing the constitutional question.  In essence, Justice Thomas’s complete lack 
of scrutiny of the legislature’s stated claims about the necessity of the search regime means that 
 
47 Id. at  2200. 
48 Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2200. 
12
the legislature becomes the arbiter of whether its methods are permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment; because the very act of the legislature passing the law means the state thinks it was 
necessary - that makes it reasonable!  The circularity of this argument is glaring. 
 As to the substance of his argument, Justice Thomas asserts that “[i]mposing a reasonable 
suspicion requirement, as urged by petitioner, would give parolees greater opportunity to 
anticipate searches and conceal criminality.”49 Unfortunately, Justice Thomas neglects to 
explain (or offer any evidence) as to the basis upon which he makes this assertion.  The Court 
determined in Knights that probationers are entitled to reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing 
before search.50 Why is the bar lower for parolees?  Is it because they are more likely than 
probationers to be engaging in criminal activity when searched?  The Court declines to mention 
whether parolees actually commit more crimes than probationers. Similarly, do parolees 
generally hide evidence faster than probationers when police approach?  Do parolees somehow 
have the ability to sense police from farther away than probationers?   If so, that might offer a 
compelling reason to lower the suspicion bar.  If not, why is it necessary to lower that bar before 
a search can commence? Justice Thomas fails to specify.  While Justice Thomas indicates that 
the recidivism problem in California indicates that those convicted of crimes are more likely to 
commit crimes again (thus making it more reasonable to search them without individualized 
suspicion), it is difficult to see what role that plays in a Fourth Amendment analysis.  All the 
concept of a “high recidivism rate” indicates is that those who have been convicted of crimes are 
more likely to be convicted a crime again; it emphatically does not mean that those who have 
committed a crime are necessarily more likely to engage in criminal behavior than other 
 
49 Id. at 2200. 
 50 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).   
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individuals.51 Indeed, propensity to commit criminal acts (which is really the concept Justice 
Thomas is basing his argument on) is not generally seen as sufficient to support a search under 
the Fourth Amendment; rather, it is the likelihood that an individual is currently committing a 
criminal act that is determinative.52 The majority cites no evidence (outside its miscast argument 
concerning recidivism) that parolees are more likely than anyone else to be committing a crime 
at a given moment in time – the essential benchmark of whether a particular search is 
reasonable.53 
While Justice Thomas attempts to salvage his point by noting that parolees are, in theory, 
deemed to have acted more harmfully than probationers,54 he fails to explain why this makes a 
difference to the Fourth Amendment analysis.  Is a search more “reasonable” because a “more-
bad actor” is targeted? Do parolees “deserve” less Fourth Amendment protection than others?55 
If that is the logic to be used, then should not individuals with criminal records be subject to a 
lower standard of suspicion than the rest of us?  Surely former law breakers “deserve” less 
protection than law abiding citizens.  To most observers, though, the concept that some people 
 
51 Justice Stevens touches on this argument in his Samson dissent.  “The Court devotes a good portion of its 
analysis to recidivism rates among parolees in California. One might question whether theses statistics . . . actually 
demonstrate that the State’s interest is being served by the searches.  That said, though, it has never been held 
sufficient to justify suspicionless searches.  If high crime rates were grounds enough for disposing of Fourth 
Amendment protections, the Amendment long ago would have become a dead letter.” Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2207. 
52 If “propensity” to commit criminal acts were the standard by which Fourth Amendment reasonableness is 
judged, then one might imagine that serial offenders who are no longer subject to any state-imposed punishment 
should nevertheless be subject to a lowered-suspicion standard, since they could be said to be more likely to commit 
crimes in the future.  Such individuals are not, however, subject to any lowered level of Fourth Amendment 
protection.  
53 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (“[T]o accommodate public and private interests 
some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search and seizure.”). 
54 Id. at 2201, citing United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). 
55 The fact that prisoners themselves have essentially no rights under the Fourth Amendment is due not to the 
fact that they are the “most bad actors”: rather, it is the unique environment of the prison itself that makes it 
necessary for normal Fourth Amendment protections to be dispensed with.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 
(1984) (holding that traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in inapplicable to prisoners, because the recognition of 
any privacy right is incompatible with the concept of incarceration and the needs of penal institutions.). 
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are more “worthy” of Fourth Amendment protection than others is a constitutional non-starter, as 
it should be.   
 2. The “Continuum” Theory of Privacy Remains Undeveloped by the   
 Court. 
 Implicit in the argument that parolees have a diminished expectation of privacy is the 
idea that since parolees could have been denied parole by the state, the fact that they are granted 
parole must mean that the state is free to impose any burden on the parolee that could have been 
imposed in prison.  “A California inmate may serve his parole period either in physical custody, 
or elect to complete his sentence out of physical custody and subject to certain conditions. Under 
the later option, the inmate remains in the legal custody of the California Department of 
Corrections through the remainder of his term.”56 Leaving aside for the moment the fact that 
Justice Thomas seems to intimate here that inmates actually have a meaningful choice in whether 
or not to accept the terms of their parole, one can see how Justice Thomas simply assumes that 
because parole falls somewhere between imprisonment and probation on the “continuum” of 
punishments, it a priori means that a diminished expectation of privacy exists.  While this 
determination might in theory be reasonable, the fact is that the Court in Samson never bothers to 
explain just why that is the case.  Why do parolees necessarily have the same subjective 
expectation of privacy as prisoners?   The Court provides no answers.  While one might assume 
that parolees have the same, or less, expectation of privacy than probationers, one might also 
assume that they have substantially more of an expectation than prisoners.  Shouldn’t that mean 
that at least some objective suspicion is necessary?  The Court unhelpfully makes assumptions 
and determinations about these relative levels of expectation of privacy without substantial 
analysis.  This lack of foundational analysis for a central proposition of the Court’s decision is 
 
56 Id. at 2199 
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unsatisfying to say the least, and undermines the majority’s assertion that Samson follows 
logically from precedent. 
 3. Despite the Court’s Insistence, Samson Allows for Arbitrary and   
 Capricious Searches of Parolees. 
 Justice Thomas also fails to persuade when he attempts to insist that there are any 
meaningful safeguards preventing arbitrary searches of parolees. One major concern raised by 
petitioners was that the California law allowed officers to search on a mere whim, the ultimate 
evil protected against by the Fourth Amendment.57 Justice Thomas felt that the law contained 
adequate protection.  “The concern that California’s suspicionless search system gives officers 
unbridled discretion . . . is belied by California’s prohibition on ‘arbitrary, capricious, or 
harassing’ searches.”58 The flaw in this reasoning is obvious.  While one might imagine a 
parolee bringing a successful claim for harassment under the law,59 it is hard to understand how a 
parolee might bring a successful claim arguing that he or she has been subject to “arbitrary” or 
“capricious” searches, given that Justice Thomas himself strongly intimates that the only real 
criteria for conducting the search is that officer have knowledge that the individual was a 
parolee.60 And so, Justice Thomas expects us to believe that the California law offer meaningful 
protection against arbitrary or capricious searches, even though the only thing the government 
would have to establish to support the search is that the officer knew the suspect was a parolee. 
While one might conceive of a situation where an officer “accidentally” searches a parolee 
 
57 Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
(1937) at 92-97 (noting that one of the primary justifications of the Revolution and the subsequent adoption of the 
Fourth Amendment was the revulsion at the unlimited search power of government officials in the colonial period.). 
58 Id. at 2201, citing Cal. Penal Code Ann. §3067(d) (West 2000) (“It is not the intent of the Legislature to 
authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment.”). 
59 Possible scenarios in which a parolee might bring a successful claim for harassment include situations where 
repeated searches by police occur in a short time frame, or where police engage in extremely invasive or destructive 
searches, or if the police were to make unnecessary searches at the workplace, etc.   
60 Id. at 2202 (“Under California precedent, we note, an officer would not act reasonably in conducting a 
suspicionless search absent knowledge that the person stopped for the search is a parolee.”). 
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whom he doesn’t actually know to be a parolee (thus making the search “arbitrary” within 
Justice Thomas’ definition, and making it illegal), such a search would be excluded regardless of 
the searchee’s status – if the officer had no other suspicion factors to point to, the search would 
be illegal as to anyone.  Of course, if the officer did have other individualized search factors to 
point to, the parolees’ parole status is irrelevant, and the search would permissible. Therefore, it 
appears as though the Court sanctions “arbitrary and capricious” searches of parolees – in the 
sense that officers can permissibly search parolees for any reason, or no reason at all, at any time 
- as long as the government official knows of the searchee’s status as a parolee – a necessary 
condition for implicating Samson’s holding in the first place. 61 While one might not object to 
such a regime as a matter of preference or policy, it is not clear at all that such a regime comports 
with the Fourth Amendment, by the Court’s own reasoning. 
 4. What happened to Special Needs Doctrine? 
 Ultimately, the most compelling – and simplest - argument for removing the usual Fourth 
Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion62 is that parolees are, in effect, special 
cases:  because they have been sentenced to prison and (presumably) cannot reintegrate into 
society successfully without intense supervision, searches on less-than-individualized suspicion 
are necessary.63 Applying this doctrinal tool to the California law in Samson would have been 
the most straightforward method of resolving the case.  Normally, a finding by the Court that 
 
61 “To say that [the] evils [of suspicionless searches] may be averted without that shield is, I fear, to pay lip 
service to the end while withdrawing the means.” Id. at 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
62 By “usual” requirement, I mean “most times” – as Justice Thomas points out in Samson, “[A]lthough this 
Court has only sanctioned suspcionless searches in limited circumstances, mainly programmatic and special needs 
searches, we have never held that these are the only limited circumstances in which searches absent individualized 
suspicion could be “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.”  Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201. 
63 I am not convinced that this is necessarily a true proposition, as my argument immediately proceeding this 
section indicates; I believe it is not at all clear that subjecting parolees to suspicionless searches is a necessary 
element of an effective parole regime.  As the petitioners in Samson argued, the majority of states, as well as the 
federal government, require some level of suspicion for parolees searches.  Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2201.  
Nevertheless, applying special needs analysis would have at least supplied the precedential hook that that majority 
opinion lacked. 
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“special needs” exist outside those of pure law-enforcement allows for an otherwise 
impermissible curtailment of the full panoply of Fourth Amendment rights. The Court has not 
been shy about recognizing special needs in other contexts.64 And yet, while Justice Thomas’s 
argument seems tailor-made for special needs analysis – replete with references to the 
penological and reintegrationist goals of the statute – the Court makes clear that “general” Fourth 
Amendment doctrine was sufficient to determine that parolees may be subjected to suspicionless 
searches.65 “Nor do we address whether California’s parole search condition is justified as a 
special need under Griffin v. Wisconson, because our holding under general Fourth Amendment 
principles renders such an examination unnecessary.”66 
The question, then, is why the Court chose to abandon special needs analysis in this case.  
While Justice Thomas asserts that because “normal” Fourth Amendment analysis is sufficient to 
decide the case, just as it was in Knights,67 this seems too facile an explanation if taken on its 
face.68 In this case, using special needs doctrine would have been the simplest ground on which 
to decide the case.  The Court could have held, uncontroversially, that managing parolees outside 
of prison is, in essence, a unique undertaking, and that suspicionless searches were necessary to 
 
64 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (permitting exceptions to the warrant and probable-
cause requirements for a search when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” make those 
requirements impracticable (quoting New Jersey v. T.L O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)); 
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) 
(holding that policy requiring all students who participated in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug 
testing was a reasonable means of furthering the school district's important interest in preventing and deterring drug 
use among its schoolchildren, and therefore did not violate Fourth Amendment); Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67 (2001) (“Given that purpose and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials at every 
stage of the policy, this case simply does not fit within the closely guarded category of ‘special needs.’”);  City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (“For example, we have upheld certain regimes of suspicionless 
searches where the program was designed to serve “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”); 
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random drug testing of student-athletes under 
“special needs” doctrine). 
65 Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201. 
66 Id. at 2199. 
67 Knights, 534 U.S. at 117-118. 
68 “We held in Knights, without recourse to Hudson – that the balance favored allowing the State to conduct 
searches based on reasonable suspicion.  Never before have we plunged below that floor absent a determination of 
‘special needs.’” Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
18
fulfill that need.  This would have comported comfortably with the Court’s precedent, and 
attracted at least one (Justice Stevens) and possibly all of the dissenters. Instead, the Court chose 
to apply the general “reasonableness” test.  
 Two explanations are possible.  First, it could be the case that the majority realized that 
attempting to show how supsicionless searches are at all reasonably necessary to promote the 
“special needs” of a parole regime was a tough sell, as it were, for the reasons outlined above.69 
Far better to simply show that it is somehow generally “reasonable” to subject convicted 
criminals to suspicionless searches, than to have to show how those searches actually promote 
the state’s penological and rehabilitative interests.70 As the dissent argues, the nature of the 
California law (allowing any law enforcement official to search any parolee at any time, without 
suspicion of criminal activity) is far too broad to reasonably comport with the special need of 
supervising parolees.  “Had the State imposed as a condition of parole a requirement that 
[prisoners] submit to random searched by his parole officer . . . the condition might have been 
justified . . . under the special needs doctrine.”71 Similarly, had the parole board singled out 
particularly dangerous or untrustworthy inmates for suspicionless searches, one might make the 
argument that the program is tailored to advancing the specific need of supervising the individual 
parolees that need the supervision the most.  The fact that the majority eschews special needs 
analysis indicates that the majority knew that a compelling “special needs” case possibly could 
not, in fact, have been made.   
 
69 See section I(B)(4), supra.
70 “Special needs” doctrine allows for searches  on less-than-full suspicion when legitimate needs “beyond the 
normal need for law enforcement make the ··· probable-cause requirement impracticable.”  O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 
U.S. 709, 725 (1987), quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J.). Searches conducted 
pursuant to “special needs” must be reasonable in scope. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656, 667 (1989).   
71 Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2207. 
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A second, more comprehensive, explanation is simply that the majority takes a very 
limited view of the scope of Fourth Amendment vis-à-vis the individual’s right to privacy and 
autonomy.  In other words, the justices composing the majority in Samson did not need to resort 
to special needs analysis because they believe that, as a general matter, the Fourth Amendment 
provides relatively little protection to the individual when the government can articulate an 
important-sounding reason to suspend the Amendment’s usual requirements.  This unbalanced 
balancing approach taken by the Court has been criticized as insufficiently protective of Fourth 
Amendment rights, as well as needlessly complicating what should be a straightforward 
application of special needs doctrine in most cases.72 
II.  Taking on the Exclusionary Rule: Hudson v. Michigan 
Regardless of its flaws, Samson was a widely anticipated decision.  Once Knights held 
that probationers did not have full Fourth Amendment rights, it was only a matter of time before 
the Court extended that basic rationale to parolees.  The Court’s decision in Hudson v. Michigan,
however, caught much of the legal community by surprise.  While there may have been clues, 
here and there, that certain justices – Justice Scalia in particular73 - had been planning to call the 
vitality of the exclusionary rule into question, the fact that the newly-composed Court moved so 
decisively – and so quickly -  following Justice O’Connor’s departure was surprising.  In this 
section, I will examine the Court’s decision in Hudson, including the dissent and Justice 
Kennedy’s enigmatic concurrence.  I will then critique Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority, 
 
72 See, e.g., Antoine McNamara, The “Special Needs” of Prison, Probation, and Parole, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
____; (forthcoming April, 2007) (arguing that searches of probationers and parolees should be justified under the 
special needs doctrine, and that alternative justifications are unsound and unnecessarily complex). 
73 See n.96,  infra.
20
centering my comments on his cavalier endorsement of alternative remedies for knock-and-
announce violations and the low bar set by the majority for the restriction of individual rights in 
the face of law enforcement prerogatives.   
A.  Existing Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule  
 Carving exceptions out of the exclusionary rule has been something of a pet project for 
the Court since the rule was incorporated to the states in Mapp.74 Finding a consistent theme to 
these carve-outs is difficult.75 Ostensibly, the Court applies the exclusionary rule only “where its 
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.”76 The test for making that 
determination allows for the application of the rule only “where its deterrence benefits outweigh 
its “substantial social costs.’”77 Whether the Court’s decisions hew closely to this formulation 
are largely a function of one’s personal opinion; since Mapp, the Court has found the rule 
inapplicable, for example, in civil trials,78 grand jury proceedings,79 when police reasonably rely 
on a warrant unsupported by probable cause,80 when police reasonably rely on statutory 
authority,81 when the evidence seized would have been inevitably discovered,82 when the illegal 
 
74 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
75 Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of The Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary 
Rule, 9 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 201, 201 at n.1 (2005) (“I am certainly not the first to observe the irrational patchwork 
covered by the exclusionary rule.”), citing Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
757 (1994) (arguing that the Court-created exceptions to the exclusionary rule are inconsistent and subject to 
personnel shifts on the Court); Donald L. Doernberg, The Rights of the People:  Reconciling Collective and 
Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 260 (1983) (exploring the “inconsistency 
in the Court's treatment of Fourth Amendment rights and remedies,”). 
76 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).   
77 Bd. Of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
907 (1984).   
78 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) ("[T]he judicially created exclusionary rule should not be 
extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a criminal law enforcement 
agent of another sovereign."). 
79 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable to grand 
jury proceedings). 
80 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 912-22 (1984) (adopting a good faith exception where officers 
reasonably rely on a warrant later found to be unsupported by probable cause). 
81 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-55 (1987) (establishing a good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule where police rely on statutory authority). 
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actions of police are sufficiently attenuated from the discovery of the evidence,83 and so forth.  
What is clear, however, is that the Court had consistently upheld the central role of the 
exclusionary rule in and of itself to Fourth Amendment analysis. 
B.  Hudson v. Michigan – The Frontal Assault on the Exclusionary Rule Begins 
 Given the Court’s history in this regard, a holding that an exclusionary remedy was not 
available for knock-and-announce violations seems like just another log on the pile. Why, then, 
should one be concerned about the Court’s decision in Hudson? I argue that the majority opinion 
in Hudson betrayed a disturbingly hostile attitude by the conservative block of the new Roberts 
Court to the very idea of the exclusionary remedy itself.  While one might legitimately question 
whether a precise fit exists between a knock-and-announce violation and an exclusionary remedy 
in this particular case, the majority opinion in Hudson makes clear that the newly-composed 
Court is beginning a serious re-evaluation of the exclusionary rule’s place in the constitutional 
order, and offers clues as to a majority of the Court’s view of personal privacy vis-à-vis the 
government’s interest in searches, surveillance, and general law enforcement. 
1.  Setting the Stage 
It all started innocently enough; in late 2005, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal 
of People v. Hudson,84 a state case in which the Michigan Supreme Court, in direct contravention 
of every other state and every federal circuit (save one), reaffirmed its decision that the 
exclusionary rule was an inappropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations.85 The 
attorney who argued the case to the Supreme Court on behalf of the petitioner, David A. Moran, 
 
82 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (establishing an exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
when the evidence illegally seized would have been inevitably discovered by authorities.) 
83 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that confession of suspect that was sufficiently 
attenuated from illegal arrest could be admitted at trial). 
84 People v. Hudson, No. 246403, 2004 WL 1366947 (Mich. Ct. App. June 17, 2004), lv. app. den., 692 N.W.2d 
385 (Mich. 2006).   
85 Hudson, 2004 WL at *1, citing People v. Vasquez, 461 Mich. 235; 602 NW2d 376 (1999); People v. Stevens, 
460 Mich. 626; 597 NW2d 53 (1999). 
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has written that he felt strongly that this case would be nothing more than an opportunity for the 
Court to rebuke the Michigan court’s outlier decision, while cleaning up some doctrinal loose 
ends emerging from Wilson v. Arkansas,86 the case that “constitutionalized” the knock-and-
announce rule less than ten years prior. 87 
The facts of Hudson were simple enough; after obtaining a warrant authorizing a search 
for drugs and firearms at the home of the defendant, Booker Hudson, the police arrived at his 
home, announced their presence, and, after waiting just “three to five seconds,” entered Mr. 
Hudson’s home.88 This was a clear knock-and-announce violation;89 indeed, Michigan 
conceded as much at trial and throughout the appeal.90 Moreover, the crime for which Mr. 
Hudson was eventually convicted, possession of crack cocaine, was “relatively minor.”91 All 
told, this should have been a fairly straightforward case of applying Wilson and holding that the 
 
86 Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). 
87 “I must confess that I really never saw it coming. When an attorney named Richard Korn telephoned me out 
of the blue in February 2005 to ask if I would take a look at a case, People v. Hudson, that he had just lost in the 
Michigan courts and assess whether it would make a good vehicle for challenging the Michigan Supreme Court's 
1999 decision in People v. Stevens, I did not hesitate. After all, I had long been critical of Stevens, which had held 
that exclusion of evidence was not an appropriate remedy for a Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce violation. 
Stevens, in effect, gave the Michigan police carte blanche to violate the knock-and-announce rule, the ancient 
common law requirement that the police must knock and generally allow residents to open their doors, thereby 
sparing residents a forcible and terrifying police entry. The Michigan Supreme Court's decision seemed especially 
vulnerable given that the United States Supreme Court had twice suppressed evidence seized after knock-and-
announce violations, and had, just eleven years ago, unanimously held that the knock-and-announce rule was part of 
the Fourth Amendment in Wilson v. Arkansas.
“Since the Michigan Supreme Court's refusal to suppress evidence seized after a knock-and-announce violation 
was out of step with the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Wilson and with the rule followed in every other state and 
federal circuit, except one, I felt confident that the Court, if it granted certiorari, would pull Michigan back into line. 
My confidence was enhanced even further when the Court granted my certiorari petition just four days after it issued 
Halbert v. Michigan, in which the Court reversed another Michigan Supreme Court decision that was radically out 
of line with the position taken by other state and federal courts. While I certainly realized that it was possible I could 
somehow lose Hudson, it never occurred to me that I could effectively kill an 800-year-old rule protecting personal 
privacy and simultaneously put the entire exclusionary rule at risk.”  
David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things:  The Roberts Court Takes on the 
Fourth Amendment. 2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 283, 295-296 (2006) (citations omitted).   
88 Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2159 (2006). 
89 Id. at 2163 
90 Id. 
91 Hudson was found by the judge at his bench trial as having possessed five rocks of crack cocaine, and was 
sentenced to probation.   Moran, 2006 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. at 298 
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exclusionary rule applied to knock-and-announce violations, just as almost every court in the 
country assumed it did.92 
And at the first oral argument in January, 2006, that seemed to be the case. While Justice 
Scalia floated the idea of §1983 being an adequate remedy to knock-and-announce violations, it 
appeared that at least five (and possibly six) justices were supportive of the idea that the 
exclusionary rule was the proper remedy. 93 As the fates would have it, though, shortly after oral 
argument Justice O’Connor, a probable supporter of Mr. Hudson’s argument,94 resigned from the 
Court.  After Justice O’Connor was replaced on the bench by Samuel Alito, the Court ordered 
 
92 Prior to oral argument, Moran believed that the only interesting question in the case was whether the 
Michigan Supreme Court had unduly expanded the “inevitable discovery” doctrine to encompass any situation in 
which a knock-and-announce violation occurred.  “Therefore, I thought Hudson was about two things: the 
importance of maintaining an effective deterrent so that police would respect the knock-and-announce rule; and, 
more abstractly, the proper scope of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. What I did not 
realize was that the case would put the exclusionary rule itself into play.”  Id. at 299. 
93 It was clear that Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens were supportive, and it appeared as though 
Justice O’Connor, and perhaps Justice Kennedy were as well.  For a transcript of the first oral argument, see 2006 
WL 88656 (U.S.), 74 USLW 3422. 
94 Justice O’Connor indicated her sympathy for Mr. Samson’s position at the first oral argument.  From that 
argument, an exchange between Justice O’Connor and David B. Salmons, Assistant to the Solicitor General, 
appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of the Respondent: 
 MR. SALMONS : No, Your Honor. The knock- and-announce requirement is--we take no issue with that. 
 That is required by the fourth amendment. With regard-- 
 JUSTICE O'CONNOR: Well-- 
 MR. SALMONS: --to deterrence-- 
 JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --but in this very case you had an officer who said it was his regular policy -- 
 MR. SALMONS: Well-- 
 JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --never to knock and announce-- 
 MR. SALMONS: That's not-- 
 JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --to just go in. So, if the rule you propose is adopted, then every police officer in 
 America can follow the same policy. Is there no policy protecting the homeowner a little bit -- 
 MR. SALMONS: Of course the-- 
 JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --and the sanctity of the home-- 
 MR. SALMONS: Of course there is-- 
 JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --from this immediate - - 
 MR. SALMONS: --Your Honor, and that is not-- 
 JUSTICE O'CONNOR: --entry? 
 MR. SALMONS: --our position. And we, respectfully, would argue that that's not an  appropriate way to 
 conduct the deterrence analysis. Even just on the terms of deterrence, we think that suppression here would 
 be a disproportionate remedy. And that's because, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the officers  
 already have an incentive, inherent in the nature of the circumstances, to announce and delay some period 
 of time before entry. 
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the case re-argued.  It soon became clear at re-argument that Justice Scalia, with a new-found 
ally, had grand plans in mind for Mr. Hudson.  As Dean. Moran recounts: 
At the re-argument . . . it became clear to me for the first time that the case 
was no longer about the knock-and-announce rule or the inevitable 
discovery doctrine when Justice Scalia asked me, in a series of questions, 
why the threat of internal police discipline would not convince officers to 
comply with the knock-and-announce rule. When I responded that such a 
notion contradicts the very premise of Mapp v. Ohio, the seminal 1961 case 
in which the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states because 
other remedies had proven worthless at deterring Fourth Amendment 
violations, Justice Scalia replied, "Mapp was a long time ago. It was before 
section 1983 was being used, wasn't it?"95 
Just a few weeks later, the Court delivered its opinion.  The result was unexpected, to 
say the least.96 
2. The Majority Opinion 
 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts, 
began by noting that knock-and-announce rule itself was not at issue; rather, the only question 
was one of remedy.97 Specifically, whether excluding evidence obtained in the home following a 
knock-and-announce violation was appropriate.98 From the start, Justice Scalia made his lack of 
enthusiasm for the exclusionary rule apparent.  “Suppression of evidence . . . has always been 
our last resort, not our first impulse . . . [we] have . . . repeatedly emphasized that the rule’s 
 
95 Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule,. supra n.87, at 299-300 (citations omitted). 
96 See, e.g., M. K. Jamison, New Developments in Search and Seizure Law, 2006-APR Army Law. 9, 25 (2006) 
(noting, in 2004, that the Court’s October, 2006 term will see a case (Hudson) dealing with the inevitable discovery 
exception to the exclusionary rule).  Needless to say, the Court had other ideas about what to do with Hudson.
97 Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2162-63.    
98 Id. 
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‘costly toll’ upon truth seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those 
urging its application.”99 
The crux of the majority’s opinion dealt with the causal connection between a violation 
and the application of the exclusionary rule.  Noting that the exclusionary rule is not 
automatically applied when evidence is obtained illegally because the causal connection “can be 
too attenuated to justify exclusion,”100 the Court found that while violations of the warrant 
requirement bear a direct relation to the discovery of evidence (because “citizens are entitled to 
shield their persons houses, papers, and effects” until a valid warrant has been issued),101 
violations of the knock-and-announce rule do not bear such a direct relationship, because the 
purpose of the rule is the “protection of human life and limb,” both of the homeowner and the 
entering agent.102 
Turning next to the deterrence effect of the exclusionary rule in this context, Justice 
Scalia notes that exclusion is appropriate only “where [its] deterrence benefits outweigh its 
substantial social costs.”103 He finds the costs here considerable; not only would incriminating 
evidence be lost, but “a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule” would deluge the 
courts, offering some defendants a virtual “get out of jail free” card.104 As opposed to these high 
costs, Justice Scalia argues that there is virtually no deterrence benefit to applying the rule, since 
the requirement can be suspended whenever there is a reasonable possibility that evidence would 
be destroyed or violence would erupt.  Just because the Court applies an exclusionary remedy to 
other violations in different contexts to deter illegal conduct does not mean that exclusion is a 
 
99 Id. at 2163 (citations omitted). 
100 Id. at 2164. 
101 Id. at 2165, citing U.S. Const. amd. IV. 
102 Id. Justice Scalia continues:  “What the knock and announce rule has never protected, however, is one’s 
interest in preventing the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant.  Since the interests that 
were violated in his case have nothing to do with the seizure of evidence, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable.”  Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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valid remedy here: “[a]nd what, other than civil suit, is the “effective deterrent” of a police 
[officer’s] violation of an already-confessed suspect's Sixth Amendment rights by denying him 
prompt access to counsel? Many would regard these violated rights as more significant than the 
right not to be intruded upon in one's nightclothes . . .”105 
Addressing the elephant in the room, Justice Scalia argues that denying an 
exclusionary remedy to knock-and-announce violations would not eviscerate the knock-
and-announce rule itself.  Given the availability of §1983 remedies to constitutional 
violations by state officers,106 §1988(b) authorization for plainitff’s attorney’s fees in 
civil rights cases,107 and the prospect of “increasingly professional” police forces, the 
majority asserts (although they admit they do not know for certain) that violations of the 
knock-and-announce rule will be adequately deterred in the absence of an exclusionary 
remedy.108 
Justice Scalia concluded by tying Hudson to three cases previously decided by the Court 
Segura v. United States,109 New York v. Harris,110 and United States v. Ramirez.111 These cases, 
Justice Scalia argued, stood for the “proposition that an impermissible manner of entry [into the 
home] does not necessarily trigger the exclusionary rule.”112 These cases, all involving some 
sort of illegal police behavior during entry into the home, and where the evidence discovered was 
 
105 Id. at 2167.  
106 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000).   
107 42 U.S.C. §1988(b)(2000). 
108 Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2167-68. 
109 Segura v. Harris, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal entry into the 
home by police need not be excluded if the police had sufficient information to obtain a warrant prior to the illegal 
entry).   
110 New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (holding that in the situation where police entered a home illegally 
and arrested the suspect, that suspect’s statements at the stationhouse need not be excluded because the exclusionary 
rule was “designed to protect the physical integrity of the home.”)   
111 United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998) (discussing in dicta that property destruction during a home 
search only mandates exclusion of recovered evidence when a sufficient causal relationship between the property 
destruction and the discovery of the evidence exists).  This portion of the opinion was joined only by Justice 
Thomas, Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts.   
112 Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2169. 
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deemed admissible, were cited primarily to show that “the reason for a rule must govern the 
sanctions for the rule’s violation.”113 In cases, like Hudson, where they do not, exclusion is not 
proper.   
 3. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
 Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote against the petitioner.114 He joined most 
of Justice Scalia’s opinion (save for the portion citing Segura, Harris, and Ramirez as support for 
the majority’s reasoning115), along with adding some thoughts of his own in concurrence.   
 To begin, Justice Kennedy offered assurances that the knock-and-announce rule was still 
alive and well.  “Two points should be underscored with respect to today’s decision.  First, the 
knock-and-announce requirement protects rights and expectations linked to ancient principles in 
our constitutional order.”116 Next, he assured his audience that the exclusionary rule maintained 
its central role in Fourth Amendment analysis.  “Second, the continued operation of the 
exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt.”117 While Kennedy 
noted the historic import of the knock requirement, he found that suppression was unjustified.  
“Under our precedents, the causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce 
requirement and a later search is too attenuated to allow suppression.”118 While the dissent was 
right to note the constitutional sanctity of the home, the fact that other civil remedies exist (such 
as §1983 claims) and the fact that no “demonstrated pattern of knock-and-announce violations” 
has been shown, Justice Kennedy argued that suppression is too strong a medicine for this 
particular constitutional violation.119 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 2170.  
115 Id. at 2168-70.   
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id.  
119 I will discuss Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in detail in section III(C)(4), infra.
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4.  The Dissent 
 Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer began by arguing that the Court’s holding  
“represents a significant departure” from precedent.120 Clearly, it was undisputed that the Fourth 
Amendment requires police to knock and announce their presence prior to executing a warrant in 
the home.121 And so, given the Court’s reasoning in Wilson that “a court must ‘conside[r]’ 
whether officers complied with the knock-and-announce requirement ‘in assessing the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure,’”122 and given Weeks and Mapp’s command that an 
unreasonable search or seizure is an illegal constitutional search and seizure requiring exclusion 
of evidence gleaned therefrom, Justice Breyer argued that an exclusionary remedy to knock-and-
announce violations flows naturally from the Court’s precedent.  “Why,” Justice Breyer asks, “is 
[the] application of the exclusionary rule any less necessary here?”123 
Turning next to the deterrence values of alternative remedies, Justice Breyer questioned 
whether knock-and-announce violations will be under-deterred.  “What reason is there to believe 
that those remedies (such as private damages actions under 42 U.S.C. §1983), which the Court 
found inadequate in Mapp, can adequately deter unconstitutional police behavior here?”124 
Noting that the Court failed to cite a single case where a plaintiff had collected more than 
nominal damages stemming from a violation,125 Justice Breyer criticized the Court for simply 
assuming that civil claims will adequately protect the integrity of the knock-and-announce 
without any supporting evidence.  Critically, Justice Breyer admonished the Court for its over-
reliance on the idea of the “substantial social costs” incurred by applying the rule here.  He 
 
120 Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171  (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
121 See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 927 (1995) (unanimously holding that the Fourth Amendment 
requires police to knock and announce their presence prior to executing a warrant in the home).   
122 Hudson, 126 U.S. at 2173, quoting  Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934.   
123 Id. at 2174. 
124 Id., citing Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J.L. & Public 
Pol’y 119, 126-129 (2003) (arguing that there is no “meaningful alternative” to exclusion).  
125 Id. at 2174. 
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argued that the costs incurred are no different than the costs incurred by any application of the 
exclusionary rule – evidence might be lost, and the guilty might go free.126 Justice Breyer 
recognized the majority’s formulation of these costs as a broader argument against exclusion:  
“The majority’s “substantial social costs” argument is an argument against the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary principle itself.”127 
Finally, Justice Breyer criticizes the majority assertion that knock-and-announce 
violations are not the “but for” causation of the discovery of evidence that typically leads to 
exclusion.  Besides the fact that this is a questionable empirical claim at best,128 Justice Breyer 
argued that it is of limited relevance.  “”[W]hether the interests underlying the knock-and-
announce requirement are implicated in any given case is, in a sense, beside the point . . . where 
a search is unlawful, the law insists upon suppression of the evidence consequently discovered, 
even if that evidence or its possession has little or nothing to do with the reasons underlying the 
constitutionality of the search.”129 In short, Justice Breyer believes that the general privacy 
values underlying the Fourth Amendment are served by exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant 
to illegal entry by police whether or not the actual discovery of evidence is causally related to the 
knock-and-announce violation.130 
C.  Critiquing Hudson 
 Two main grounds of criticism arise from the majority’s opinion in Hudson. First is the 
majority’s insistence that civil remedies will adequately protect individuals’ right under Wilson 
126 Id. at 2177. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2177-79. 
129 Id. at 2181. 
130 The dissent concludes by noting that the Court’s precedents allow for no-knock entries where the danger of 
violence or the destruction of evidence are reasonable possibilities, thus blunting the United States’ argument that 
the exclusionary rule is too harsh a remedy for knock-and-announce violations given the possibility of loss of 
evidence, Id at 2181-82, as well as criticizing the majority’s reliance on Segura, Harris¸ and Ramirez.  Id. at 2183-
86. 
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to be informed of police presence before entry.  Second, the majority formulates a social 
cost/deterrence benefit balancing test that will in theory almost never result in the application of 
the exclusionary rule.  Whether or not this is by design,131 the majority’s methodology has called 
into question the continued vitality of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment 
violations, and provides compelling evidence of the “conservative” block’s conception of 
individual privacy and dignity vis-à-vis the interests of government and law enforcement.  
 1. Despite the Court’s Insistence, the Efficacy of Civil Suits to Remedy   
 Knock-and-Announce Violations is Effectively Nil 
 To begin, Justice Scalia’s assertion at oral argument and in his opinion that 42 U.S.C. 
§1983 provides an adequate remedy for victims of knock-and-announce violations132 is dubious 
at best.  Justice Scalia effectively argues that, in the absence of an exclusionary remedy, every 
time the police commit a knock-and-announce violation (an event one might expect to occur 
more frequently following Hudson),133 the aggrieved party will have the knowledge, resources, 
ability, and time to successfully bring a §1983 action in federal court. 134 The dissent in Hudson 
recognized this reasoning as pure sophistry.  “What reason is there to believe that those remedies 
(such as private damages actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), which the Court found inadequate in 
Mapp, can adequately deter unconstitutional police behavior here?”135 The dissent continues: 
 
131 I argue that the majority intentionally placed the continued vitality of the exclusionary rule in question, based 
on the content of the opinion and Justice Scalia’s statements at oral argument.  See section III(A), infra.
132 Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2167. 
133 Given that Hudson removes one deterrent to violations (however effective one believes it to be), logic 
suggests that this would have the effect of necessarily increasing the number of violations, at least in the short term.  
Whether increased use of civil remedies will, in the long term, reduce the number of violations (as Justice Scalia 
intimates, but can’t bring himself to fully argue) is obviously an open question, and will be for some time.   
134 Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2167. (“Dollree Mapp could not turn to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for meaningful relief; Monroe 
v. Pape,, which began the slow but steady expansion of that remedy, was decided the same Term as Mapp. It would 
be another 17 years before the §1983 remedy was extended to reach the deep pockets of municipalities.” ).  One 
might be right to question Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm even for his proposed remedy, given his backhanded tone. 
135 Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2174 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure 
Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 119, 126-129 (2003) (arguing that “five decades of post- Weeks 
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“T]he majority, like Michigan and the United States, has failed to cite a 
single reported case in which a plaintiff has collected more than nominal 
damages solely as a result of a knock-and-announce violation.” . . As 
Justice Stewart, the author of a number of significant Fourth Amendment 
opinions, explained, the deterrent effect of damage actions ‘can hardly be 
said to be great,’ as such actions are ‘expensive, time-consuming, not 
readily available, and rarely successful.’”136 
Responding to this critique, Justice Scalia would have us believe that 42 U.S.C. §1988(b), which 
provides for attorney’s fees for civil rights plaintiffs, provides an adequate incentive for attorneys 
to pursue knock-and-announce claims in federal court.137 Justice Scalia notes that “[t]he number 
of public-interest law firms and lawyers who specialize in civil rights grievances has greatly 
expanded.”138 The insincerity of this argument is apparent.  Even given the existence of 42 
U.S.C. §1988(b), relatively few defendants would have the wherewithal and the resources to find 
representation and bring such claims to their conclusion.  Indeed, what would be the point?  By 
the time the civil case was tried or settled, the suspect in question would have been acquitted of 
the charge or already released, or still be imprisoned.  Does Justice Scalia believe that a civil suit 
for nominal damages (the cost of a broken door, say) will be pursued by most (or even some) of 
these individuals, especially if they are no longer incarcerated, even if they had the prospect of 
representation? 139 It would hardly seem worth the trouble, given the slim prospects for 
 
‘freedom’ from the inhibiting effect of the federal exclusionary rule failed to produce any meaningful alternative to 
the exclusionary rule in any jurisdiction” and that there is no evidence that “times have changed” post- Mapp).   
136 Id. at 2174, quoting Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future 
of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L.Rev. 1365, 1388 (1983). 
137 Id. at 2167. 
138 Id. 
139 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 111 (2003) (noting plaintiffs’ 
high failure rate and theoretically high barriers to success in civil actions for exclusionary violations);  William C. 
Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy, 88 Geo. L.J. 799, 828 (2000) 
(agreeing with the Court’s finding in Leon that once a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, the injury is 
essentially irreversible and cannot easily be repaired). 
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substantial recovery.  Prospects for pro se plaintiffs are even dimmer.140 Justice Scalia’s 
assertion that there are a “greatly expanded” number of public interest law firms who specialize 
in civil rights grievances is equally un-compelling.  Justice Scalia provides no evidence (nor 
even argues) that there are sufficient numbers of attorneys available and willing to handle the 
new civil suits that he claims will take the place of suppression motions, nor does he provide any 
guidance as to whether the Court would be willing to re-establish an exclusionary remedy for 
violations should that unknown number of civil-rights attorneys dip below a certain level - or 
whether such a thing could even be measured accurately. 
 Similarly, putting aside for the moment the question of efficacy, the Court’s preference 
for post hoc civil remedies undermines another main rationale for its decision – the danger of a 
“flood” of knock-and-announce suppression claims.  Justice Scalia argues that “[i]mposing that 
massive remedy [exclusion] . . . would generate a flood” of claims for suppression.141 However, 
most criminal cases that go to trial will include a suppression hearing anyway; there would seem 
to be no great burden in allowing knock-and-announce claims to be brought alongside other 
suppression claims a defendant may have.142 Given that - until Hudson - it had been assumed by 
 
140 Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in Federal Court, 47 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 157, 176-187 (1972) (arguing that the vast majority of pro se prisoners are unable to state valid claims of 
civil rights violations); Richard Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 237, 285-86 (2006) (“Unable to 
hire a lawyer or investigator, with no right to an appointed lawyer, the typical indigent, convicted, and innocent 
person is unlikely to be able to uncover any evidence that would prove that he or she did not commit the crime. Even 
if the wrongfully convicted person is fortunate to find evidence that casts doubt upon guilt, and can either initiate 
litigation pro se or find a lawyer willing to take the case, the person still has to navigate the perilous waters of 
retroactivity, time limits, procedural defaults, finality, difficult burdens of proof, and downright judicial hostility in 
order to gain relief.”). 
141 Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66. 
142 Indeed, Justice Scalia argues that determinations of whether knock-and-announce violations occurred are 
inherently more complicated – requiring more “extensive litigation” – than determining whether, say, the warrant or 
Miranda requirements have been fulfilled.  “What constituted a “reasonable wait time’ in a particular case . . . .or 
whether there was reasonable suspicion . . . is difficult for the trial court to determine and even more difficult for an 
appellate court to review.  Id. at 2166.   
 This argument borders on the absurd.  Given the complex and often contradictory nature of the Court’s 
other criminal procedure jurisprudence – especially its warrant and Miranda jurisprudence - it simply boggles the 
mind that Justice Scalia actually believes that, for some reason, knock-and-announce motions are more than the 
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most courts that an exclusionary remedy existed for knock-and-announce violations, and given 
that the criminal courts have not been suffering from a deluge of knock-and-announce 
suppression motions, Justice Scalia is clearly overstating the threat to judicial economy posed by 
allowing exclusion.  Indeed, Justice Scalia’s judicial economy argument seems especially 
disingenuous given his full-blown endorsement of a §1983 remedy, a far more costly and time 
consuming process than a straightforward suppression motion to the trial court.143 
2. The Court’s Social Cost v. Deterrence Benefit Analysis Will Almost Never  
 Result in the Application of the Exclusionary Rule 
More fundamentally, the Court engages in a social cost/deterrence benefit analysis that 
can be expected to forego the application of the exclusionary rule in most circumstances. As to 
the costs of imposing the rule, Justice Scalia warns that  “[i]n addition to the grave adverse 
consequences that exclusion of relevant evidence always entails,” including the release of 
“dangerous criminals” into society and handicapping police in effectuating investigations and 
arrest, “imposing that massive remedy . . . would generate a flood” of claims for suppression.144 
On the other hand, deterrence benefits would be small: since there is not strong incentive for 
police to violate the rule, and since civil remedies are available,145 “deterrence of knock-and-
announce violations is not worth a lot.”146 Justice Scalia clearly signaled his broader intentions 
at oral argument when he said that “Mapp was a long time ago. It was before section 1983 was 
 
criminal court system can handle on a regular basis.  One would be justified, I think, in questioning the sincerity of 
Justice Scalia’s belief in this line of reasoning. 
143 One might be justified in wondering whether the majority was cognizant of this contradiction, and chose to 
argue it anyway, thus betraying their true enthusiasm for the knock-and-announce rule in and of itself. 
144 Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2165-66. 
145 See section II(C)(1), supra.
146 Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2166. 
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being used, wasn't it?"147 Obviously, Justice Scalia (and, by extension, the four other justices 
that signed onto the reasoning of his opinion) more or less agree with this sentiment. 
The danger in the Court’s formulation of this balancing act is that it by its very 
formulation favors the government interest over that of individual’s interest in autonomy, 
privacy, and dignity – the essential values protected by the Fourth Amendment.  One could 
almost always successfully argue that reducing the risk of letting “dangerous criminals” go free, 
or the reducing the risk of handicapping the ability of police to effectively investigate crime, 
arrest criminals, and protect themselves is more important than maintaining one individual’s 
interest in some amorphous conception of privacy. This is especially true when one is a 
considering somewhat peripheral constitutional right like the knock-and-announce rule. This 
“thumb on the scale” method of applying the exclusionary rule has been heavily criticized from 
many quarters as being designed to prevent the application of the exclusionary rule in most 
circumstances,148 as well as being guilty of false precision.149 
3.  The Court’s Assault on Exclusion Ignores the Judicial Integrity Rationale of  
 the Exclusionary Rule 
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of the Court’s assault on the exclusionary rule is that 
Hudson fails to address the higher-order purpose served by the exclusionary rule – judicial 
integrity.  Terry is worth quoting at length here: 
 
147 Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, supra n.87 at 299-300 (citations omitted). 
148 See, e.g., Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of The Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary Rule,
supra  n.74 (describing the Court’s cost-benefit analysis as a “sham”); Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule 
Reconsidered:  Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 261, 261 (1998) (describing the Court’s test 
as “flawed”); Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure, and the Rehnquist Court, 34 Tulsa L. Rev. 465, 487 
(1999) (arguing that the results of the Court’s balancing test are “quite predictable” given the formulation of the test 
itself). 
149 Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered:  Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 261, 305-306 (1998) (“[T]he exclusionary rule has been converted into an unprincipled economic version of 
the Rorschach ink blot, called the cost-benefit analysis. Using an economic metaphor, but without measurable 
empirical data to weigh, the Supreme Court has too often engaged in what can only be described as adjudication by 
hunch.”). 
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“The [exclusionary rule] also serves another vital function-‘the imperative 
of judicial integrity.’ Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and 
will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of 
citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such 
invasions. Thus in our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in 
which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some 
conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other 
actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we 
recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which 
produced the evidence, while an  application of  the exclusionary rule 
withholds the constitutional imprimatur.”150 
While the Hudson majority asserts that civil remedies will be sufficient to make victims 
of constitutional violations whole - a dubious assertion at best151 - its focus on deterrence as the 
sole justification for the exclusionary rule is unsatisfying.  Judicial integrity is (or at least was) a 
key rationale behind the Court’s recognition of the rule in Weeks and Mapp.152 
Now, one would be justified in arguing that the “judicial integrity” train has long since 
left the station when it comes to the exclusionary rule, given the myriad exceptions to the rule 
carved out since Mapp.153 In none of those rule-limiting decisions does the Court seem 
particularly troubled with the idea that the integrity of the judicial system is compromised when 
evidenced seized in the wake of illegal police behavior is used against the defendant in one 
fashion or another. If that is the case, why should one be concerned with Hudson? Isn’t this 
 
150 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).   
151 See section II (B)(1), infra.
152 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (Day, J.) (“The tendency of those who execute the criminal 
laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often 
obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal 
Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support 
of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such 
fundamental rights.”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Clark, J.) (“But, as was said in Elkins, ‘there is another 
consideration-the imperative of judicial integrity.’ The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him 
free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard 
of the charter of its own existence.”) (citations omitted). 
153 See section II(A), supra.
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case just more of the same? There are two responses.  First, simply because the Court has had a 
history of carving exceptions to the exclusionary rule without paying adequate heed to this 
fundamental concern is not an excuse for ignoring it in the future; the integrity of the trials and 
the judicial process as a whole is central to the purpose of the rule. As Professor Norton has 
suggested, “deterrence need not and should not be viewed as the only, or even the most 
important, justification for the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Constitution.”154 
Certainly, the idea of exclusion being necessary to legitimize criminal trials is a consistent theme 
throughout the early exclusion cases.155 
Second, the decision in Hudson is qualitatively different than the Court’s prior 
recognition of exceptions to the rule in ways which seriously undermine the legitimacy of trials 
in which evidence gleaned pursuant to a knock-and-announce violation is admitted.  The removal 
of an exclusionary remedy in these situations places the Court in the position of removing an 
exclusionary remedy at trial for blatant, knowing constitutional violations by government 
officials that lead directly to the discovery of evidence.  This stands in contrast to the Court’s 
prior carve-outs, which allowed for introduction of illegally obtained evidence in venues outside 
the prosecution’s case-in-chief,156 where the violation and the discovery of evidence was in some 
sense “separate” from the illegal activity of the officers,157 or where the officers had a good faith 
 
154 Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered:  Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 261, 284 (1998).  
155 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968);  
156 The exclusionary rule is generally  not applicable in grand jury proceedings (United States v. Calandra, 414 
U.S. 338 (1984)); deportation proceedings (INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)); federal civil tax 
proceedings (United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); habeas corpus proceedings (Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 
(1976); and parole revocation hearings (Pa. Bd. of Prob. v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998). 
157 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding that confession of suspect was 
sufficiently attenuated from illegal arrest, and thus could be admitted at trial); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 
(1988) (holding that illegal investigatory behavior by police does not render evidence inadmissible if discovered 
independently of the illegal activity; also, evidence that would have inevitably been discovered is admissible at 
trial).   
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belief that they were acting in accordance with the law.158 In none of these situations could an 
officer knowingly violate a suspect’s constitutional rights, yet use at trial evidence directly 
obtained thereby.  Now, after Hudson, they can.  Take, for example, a situation where Officer is 
about to enter Suspect’s home pursuant to a valid warrant.  Suspect is engaging in some sort of 
illegal activity that could be ceased, without leaving incriminating evidence, if given a few 
second’s notice, within sight of the doorway.  Officer knowingly chooses not to knock-and-
announce, and enters the home.  Suspect is seen by Officer engaging in the illegal activity.  No 
exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule apply.  At trial, evidence of the illegal activity is 
presented.  Prior to Hudson, it was assumed that such evidence could not have been admitted, 
because its discovery was the direct result of a constitutional violation.  After Hudson, such 
evidence is admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief.  Never before has the Court sanctioned 
the use at trial of evidence gleaned as a direct and knowing result of a violation of someone’s 
rights.  With Hudson, they have.  While it seems unsavory to defend the application of the 
exclusionary rule in a given instance by arguing that the proper application of the rule shields 
illegal conduct from discovery, that is the natural byproduct of the rule:  privacy, dignity, and 
autonomy is deemed important enough to justify the possibility that evidence on occasion will be 
lost and crimes will go unprotected.  An honest defense of the rule must acknowledge this fact: 
he exclusionary rule will seldom – but sometimes – protect criminals.  And that is the way it 
should be, if the goal of Fourth Amendment adjudication is the promotion of the legitimate 
privacy and dignity interests of all individuals, and the maintenance of the integrity of the 
judicial system. 
 
158 Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that evidence obtained during search conducted 
pursuant to a facially valid warrant is admissible, even if warrant later found to be unsupported by probable cause).   
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4.  Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence Supports the Notion that the    
 Exclusionary Rule is in Danger 
 Some might question whether Hudson truly marks the opening salvo in an effort to 
repudiate the exclusionary rule.  Isn’t it a bit reactionary to assume some grand scheme to 
overturn such a fundamental rule based on one case alone?  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
provides clues that change is in the air.  In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy took pains to 
emphasize the historical importance – and the continued vitality - of the knock-and-announce 
rule.  And yet, he supported the reasoning of a majority opinion that removed what had almost 
universally been assumed to be the proper remedy for a knock-and-announce violation - 
exclusion.159 What message was Justice Kennedy trying to send by concurring?   
 One reading of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supports the conclusion that he believes 
that the “conservative” block of the Court (which he is often mentioned as a part of) has called 
into question the continued vitality of the rule.  Clearly, Justice Kennedy agreed with the 
majority’s finding that the purposes of the knock-and-announce rule were not served by 
excluding evidence seized from the home in the wake of a violation.  “Under our precedents the 
causal link between a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement and a later search is too 
attenuated to allow suppression.”160 While he ruminates that a “demonstrated pattern of knock-
and-announce violations” might lead the Court to reconsider its decision in Hudson, he notes that 
such a move would force the Court to fundamentally re-evaluate causation doctrine as applied to 
Fourth Amendment analysis.  He notes that the prospects of the Court undertaking such a sea-
change are a long shot, at best.161 The only portion of the Court’s opinion Justice Kennedy takes 
 
159 See Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, supra n.87, at 299.   
160 Id. 2170-71. 
161 Id. at 2171. 
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issue with, apparently, is the Court’s analysis of Segura, Harris, and Martinez, and yet even then 
he simply discounts Justice Scalia’s analysis as having limited relevance.   
 The question, then, is why Justice Kennedy concurred.  If he was in substantial 
agreement with the Court’s conclusions, why not just sign on to the opinion?   This is clearly not 
a case of a “limiting” concurrence; Justice Kennedy makes clear that he adopts the majority’s 
reasoning, and notwithstanding his somewhat off-handed remark that changing situations might 
someday cause the Court to reconsider its decision (a position he essentially discounts in the next 
sentence), the concurrence leaves no “wiggle room” for lower courts looking to soften the blow 
of the majority’s opinion.   
 The only plausible answer is that Justice Kennedy concurred to make but one point:  
“[T]he continued operation of the exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is 
not in doubt.”162 Justice Kennedy wants to reassure his audience that the Court’s decision does 
not call the vitality of the rule into question.  This, of course, begs the question – if there really 
was nothing to worry about, why does Justice Kennedy find it necessary to reassure us?  If it 
were clear from the Court’s reasoning that knock-and-announce violations were on a relatively 
short, finite list of violations that do not carry a remedy of exclusion, there would be no reason 
for him to concur.  Most likely, Justice Kennedy recognizes the tone and substance of the 
majority opinion for what they are – a bold indication by four justices that they believe that 
application of the exclusionary rule is not appropriate for most Fourth Amendment violations, 
and that the scope of the rule will be dramatically constricted as the new Court matures.163 
While Justice Kennedy might someday be the deciding fifth vote that keeps such a fundamental 
 
162 Id. at 2170. 
163 Justice Kennedy’s own line of reasoning in Hudson almost assures that the exclusionary rule is slated for 
substantial contraction, if not outright repudiation, despite his apparent preference to the contrary.  By endorsing the 
majority’s social costs vs. deterrence benefits methodology,  Justice Kennedy endorses a methodology that will 
almost never result in the application of the rule.  See section II(C)(2), supra.
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change at bay, one wonders whether Justice Kennedy could supply that vote while remaining 
consistent with the reasoning he endorses in Hudson.164 Nevertheless, it is clear that Justice 
Kennedy believes, whether he admits it or not, that the “conservative” block of the Court has 
embarked upon a process of dramatically curtailing the exclusionary rule – a process he will be 
in the position to ratify or reject. 
 
III.  Samson and Hudson Together:  The Roberts Court Deemphasizes Personal Privacy, 
Dignity, and Autonomy 
 
Ultimately, the controversy over the particular remedy for a knock-and-announce 
violation is of relatively minor importance the larger constitutional order.  While one would be 
justified in decrying the effective passing of an ancient tenant of security in the home,165 it seems 
as though essentially allowing police to proceed into a suspect’s home without announcing their 
presence and waiting a few seconds is a marginal, at best, curtailment of liberty.  This is 
especially true when one considers the widespread use of no-knock warrants and the broad 
“exigent circumstances” exception to the knock-and-announce rule, both of which allows police 
officers to enter a suspect’s home unannounced if they reasonably believe that announcing their 
 
164 Justice Kennedy has become somewhat notable for agreeing in principle with a particular line of reasoning, 
but requiring facts so specific that it becomes difficult or impossible for plaintiffs to meet the standard.  Supreme 
Court reporter Dahlia Lithwick summed up this tendency colorfully:   
 Kennedy, in short, look[ed] poised to do that thing he does—close the constitutional door to everyone but 
 Elijah . . This brand of jurisprudence is the Kennedy blue-plate special. He is officially waiting for the 
 perfect facts before he decides environmental cases, racial gerrymandering cases, and possibly voluntary 
 desegregation cases, too. He'll agree with the liberals in theory, agree with the conservatives in specifics, 
 and nobody will know what to do about anything. 
Dahlia Lithwick, “Affirmative Inaction,” Dec. 4, 2006, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2154853/.   
165 See Hudson, 126 S. Ct. at 2171-72 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (decrying the majority’s decision to find no 
exclusionary remedy to knock-and-announce violations under the Fourth Amendment, despite the roots of the 
requirement dating “back to the 13th century). 
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presence will present a threat of violence or will lead to the destruction of evidence.166 Likewise, 
in regards to the Court’s holding in Samson, the question of whether parolees have access to full 
(or even just some) Fourth Amendment rights – in particular the right not to be searched without 
cause  - was something of a foregone conclusion given the Court’s precedent, and does not, at 
first glance, seem to bode especially ill for the future of the republic. 
 The unspectacular nature of these rulings on the surface obscures their far-reaching 
implications, only some of which are immediately obvious.  What was most notable about 
Hudson was the majority’s clear indication that the exclusionary rule is now up for grabs.  
Whereas the Court before Hudson had essentially agreed with the fundamental premise of Mapp 
– that “experience has taught that [exclusion] is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct 
in the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable 
searches and seizures would be a mere ‘form of words,’”167 and simply carved out exceptions to 
that general rule where appropriate,168 the majority opinion in Hudson betrays a much more 
fundamental opposition to the application of the rule in most criminal contexts.  Similarly, while 
one might ultimately agree with the Court’s conclusion in Samson that parolees should be subject 
to searches on less than probable cause, the Court’s rather cavalier assumption that the 
government’s interest in supervising parolees overrides the interest of the parolee to be searched 
only when there is reason to believe some sort of criminal conduct is afoot is disturbing.   This is 
especially true given the fact that the majority’s opinion fails to argue compellingly that such 
suspicionless searches actually serve the penological, rehabilitative, and reintegrationist goals of 
parole.169 
166 Wilson v. Arkansas, 515 U.S. 927, 936 (1995). 
167 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968), citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
168 See id. (“Moreover, in some contexts the rule is ineffective as a deterrent.”). 
169 See section I(C)(1), infra.
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Looking at these decisions as a whole, two conclusions arise.  The first is that, in the 
immediate wake of Justice O’Connor’s retirement, the continued vitality of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is clearly in doubt.  The second conclusion, again growing 
directly out of the Court’s change in personnel, is that there now is a majority on the Court that 
will largely accept the idea that the State’s interest in law enforcement overrides the individual 
interest in autonomy, dignity, and privacy in the Fourth Amendment context.  While this 
development has obvious implications in the “ordinary” criminal procedure context, as discussed 
above, it potentially has more far reaching consequences for the “new generation” of search and 
seizure cases, only some of which deal in substantial part with “classic” Fourth Amendment 
issues.  This “new generation” of cases will involve the Court in decisions on national security, 
executive powers, detainee rights, and privacy in the Internet age  
A.  The Exclusionary Rule Is Now In Play  
The first lesson to take from the Roberts Court’s first major Fourth Amendment cases is 
that, at least in the short-to-middle term, the exclusionary rule has reached its apex and may well 
be significantly contracted.  Justice Scalia made clear at oral argument and in his opinion that 
Hudson was about more than the potentially loose fit between knock-and-announce violations 
and the deterrence rationale behind the exclusionary rule.  After remarking at oral argument to 
counsel for the petitioner that Mapp was outdated,170 Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion for the 
majority that:  
 We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary deterrence  
 simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different  
 contexts and long ago.  That would be forcing the public today to pay for  
 
170 See n.___, supra.
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the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost a half  
 century ago.171 
If Justice Scalia simply believed that knock-and-announce violations did not fit comfortably with 
an exclusionary remedy (a conviction he no doubt holds), there would be no reason to comment 
upon the “sins” and “inadequacies” of the exclusionary regime as a whole.172 Clearly, Justice 
Scalia is making a larger point about where he hopes to take the Court’s exclusionary 
jurisprudence.  This is not the first time he has intimated his intentions.173 The numbers seem to 
work in Justice Scalia’s favor; Justice Thomas, his long-time ally, clearly agrees with this 
sentiment.  While it is difficult to speculate given their short tenures at this writing, it appears as 
though the newest members of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, also agree with 
this roll-back; if they did not, one would expect them to have joined Justice Kennedy in 
concurrence.  And so, Justice Kennedy, the wavering ally, would be the crucial fifth vote to 
severely curtail or overturn exclusion.  The prospects of Justice Kennedy becoming the deciding 
 
171 Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2167.   
172 The irony of such a statement being made in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia is eye-opening.  Justice 
Scalia, of course, has premised his constitutional philosophy on an “originalist” view of the Constitution, which (put 
overly simply) posits that the Constitution should be understood to mean what it meant at the time that it was ratified 
and that the text of the document being construed, the debates that led to its ratification, and that the “beliefs, 
attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties” of the adopters of that text are all that is to be consulted when 
applying the text at hand to the case at bar.  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 
856-857 (1989); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353, 357 (2006).  To say that 
the public should not be forced to “pay for the sins and inadequacies of a legal regime that existed almost a half-
decade ago” is to wonder why Justice Scalia so often “forces” the public to pay for the sins of old legal regimes in so 
many other contexts, and why Justice Scalia abandoned his usual practice in the case of knock-and-announce 
violations. 
 One might answer these queries by noting that Justice Scalia takes aim at the “legal regime” of exclusion 
erected by the Court in Weeks and Mapp, not the legal regime surrounding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment 
itself, which is the only legal regime inviolate to an originalist.  In response, one might in turn argue that given the 
patently inadequate remedies available for knock-and-announce violations in the wake of Hudson, see section II(C), 
supra, the Court has essentially read the requirement (which predated the Fourth Amendment) out of the 
Constitution – certainly a non-originalist action, bearing in mind that Justice Scalia himself claims not to dispute that 
knock-and-announce is a constitutional requirement.  Such a determination, of course, requires one to agree with the 
idea that exclusion is the only truly effective remedy yet discovered for Fourth Amendment violations.  
173 See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("One hears the 
complaint, nowadays, that the Fourth Amendment has become constitutional law for the guilty; that it benefits the 
career criminal (through the exclusionary rule) often and directly.”). 
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fifth vote are outlined above.174 As of this writing, another Court vacancy filled under a 
Republican president might well make moot Justice Kennedy’s participation in the Roberts 
Court’s new Fourth Amendment course. 
 No longer can it be said, as it was by  Professor Oliver just two years ago, that “[t]he 
Court has used the opinions creating exceptions to the rule to obscure its continued support for 
the rule that it has not abandoned.”175 Clearly, Hudson marks a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence 
away from carving exceptions to the rule, towards questioning the basic validity of the rule itself.  
While it is still early in the new Court’s tenure, the Roberts Court may yet prove correct Justice 
Brennan’s then-premature proclamation that the exclusionary rule is soon to be a historical 
footnote of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.176 
B. Hudson and Samson Together – The Court Takes a Dim View of Personal           
Privacy, Dignity, and Autonomy 
 More fundamentally, Samson and Hudson can be seen as natural outgrowths of the 
“conservative” block’s view of the balance between constitutionally protected personal privacy 
and the interests of government in law enforcement and social control.  In Samson, the Court 
found that society’s interest in supervising parolees outweighed any expectation of privacy, 
dignity, or autonomy that parolees might subjectively or objectively have; in Hudson, the Court 
found that society’s interest in effective law enforcement (through admission of evidence 
discovered following an illegal entry into the home) outweighed the citizen’s right to be 
informed of police presence before entry.  
 
174 See section II(C)(4), supra.
175 Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Better Categorical Balance of The Costs and Benefits of the Exclusionary 
Rule, 9 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 201, 242 (2005).   
176 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I am left with the uneasy 
feeling that today's decision may signal that a majority of my colleagues have positioned themselves to reopen the 
door still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule in search-and-seizure cases...."). 
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The troubling aspect of the Roberts Court’s decisions in these cases is not so much its 
substantive determinations about the particular questions presented, although highly 
questionable; rather, it is the fact that the Court’s formulations of the balancing test between 
constitutionally protected autonomy and law enforcement ensure that in the predominance of 
future cases of this sort, one can expect that the government’s interests will predominate over 
those of the individual.  In Samson, the Court determined that it was reasonable for the 
government to essentially have the unfettered right to search any parolee at any time.  This is 
troubling, not because parolees should be free from intense oversight, but because it puts 
government officials in the position of being able to search someone just because. In essence, 
the Court held that since parolees need oversight, suspicionless searches are acceptable.  The 
conclusion, however, does not follow from the premise.  If the Court in Samson had bothered to 
attempt to tie such searches to the effective supervision of parolees, instead of simply assuming 
the relationship to be self-evident, or had undertaken a good-faith special needs analysis, the 
decision might be justifiable. It appears as though the reason the Court did not tie these together 
is because it could not; there is at this point no reason to believe that suspicionless searches play 
any significant role in the penological or rehabilitative goals of parole.177 Given that the Fourth 
Amendment has long been construed as being primarily concerned with preventing searches 
unless justified by probability of contemporaneous wrongdoing, this penchant for automatically 
equating effective supervision with almost-unfettered official discretion to search is worrisome.   
 The same is true for the Court’s decision in Hudson; as the majority sees it, the 
government’s ability to use evidence discovered following a blatant illegality trumps the 
individual’s right to (sometimes) be notified before the police enter the home.  To the extent one 
believes the exclusionary rule to be the most effective method yet discovered for deterring 
 
177 See section I(C)(1), supra.
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Fourth Amendment violations,178 the Court’s move away from the rule potentially opens the door 
to a vast restructuring of the power balance between individuals and the state.  Even those, like 
Justice Scalia, who feel that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule only protects the guilty179 
(a crass characterization), should recognize that guilty people are of course still entitled to the 
effective protection of their rights, and that the integrity of the criminal justice system is 
denigrated when the government is allowed to retain the advantages of evidence seized 
unconstitutionally.180 The idea that the government can knowingly violate an individual’s 
constitutional rights and yet incur no meaningful penalty (such as the exclusion of evidence from 
trial) is fundamentally antithetical to a constitutional order premised on individual liberty.  Civil 
remedies do not appear to offer sufficient disincentives for government actors to forgo 
unconstitutional behavior when real damages are slight.181 Such questions of government power 
and individual liberty – and the tradeoffs that must be made to accommodate the needs of both - 
come to light dramatically in exclusionary rule cases, which is why such cases like Hudson 
operate as effective barometers of the Court’s more fundamental inclinations.182 
Hudson and Samson were the most stark examples in the Roberts Court’s first term of the 
Justices’ predilections on these fundamental questions.  The “minor” Fourth Amendment cases 
decided by the new Court in its first term do nothing to undermine these observations.  In United 
 
178 See Kamisar, In Defense of a Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, supra n.124, at 126-129.  
179 See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
180 See Heffernen, supra n.___ at 849.  (“By stripping the wrongdoer of all gain, a court provides a deterrent 
against future misconduct. In addition, disgorgement also makes clear a court's unwillingness to countenance 
wrongful behavior.”). 
181 See section II(C)(1), supra, for a discussion on the inefficacy of civil remedies to deter Fourth Amendment 
violations. 
182 Oliver, Categorical Balance at n.53, citing Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two 
Models of Criminal Procedure, 121 U.Pa. L. Rev. 506, 575 (1973) (“The exclusionary rule only makes this conflict 
(reliable fact-finding vs. the concern for individual rights) obvious.  Any protection of individual rights against 
police tactics that procduce reliable evidence will have this effect.”). 
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States v. Grubbs,183 a unanimous Court (argued before Justice Alito joined the bench) held that 
“anticipatory warrants” are not per se unconstitutional, a holding in accord with every federal 
circuit that had considered the question.184 In Brigham City v. Stuart, 185 the Court unanimously 
held that police who witnessed a fight through a screen door could enter the home under the 
“exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement.186 In Georgia v. Randolph,187 the 
Court held 5-4 that a warrantless search of the home is invalid as to a “physically present co-
occupant” who refuses to consent to police entry.188 
In Randolph, the need to properly weigh the ethereal concepts of individual privacy, 
autonomy, and dignity with the concrete interest of government in law enforcement pervades 
Justice Souter’s majority opinion. “Yes, we recognize the consenting tenant's interest as a citizen 
in bringing criminal activity to light . . . [a]nd we understand a co-tenant's legitimate self-interest 
in siding with the police to deflect suspicion raised by sharing quarters with a criminal . . . [b]ut 
society can often have the benefit of these interests without relying on a theory of consent that 
ignores an inhabitant's refusal to allow a warrantless search.”189 Once again, Justice Kennedy 
was the deciding fifth vote, leaving the “conservative block” in this case to sign on to the 
majority opinion joined by Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens. 
 Chief Justice Roberts delivered a strong dissent, arguing that majority’s formulation of 
society’s expectations of privacy is without compelling support, and that the risks to effective 
law enforcement and prevention of domestic violence override the slight gains to privacy. He 
 
183 United States v. Grubbs, 126 S. Ct. 1494 (2006). 
184 Id. at 1499, citing United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 364 (C.A.3 1999) (collecting cases). 
185 Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006).   
186 Id. at 1949. 
187 Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).   
188 Id. at 1518-19 (Souter, J., for the majority).   
189 Id. at 1524.   
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emphasized that privacy is curtailed once the information sought (for instance, the presence of 
drugs in the home) has been disclosed to others, even if disclosed only in a co-habitory or 
familial sense. “The Constitution, however, protects . . . privacy, and once privacy has been 
shared, the shared information, documents, or places remain private only at the discretion of the 
confidant.”190 Of interest here, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly plays out the “minor imposition, 
severe consequences” balancing act in support of broader government power, just as the majority 
did in Samson and Hudson: “Just as the source of the majority's rule is not privacy, so too the 
interest it protects cannot reasonably be described as such . . . [w]hile the majority's rule protects 
something random, its consequences are particularly severe.”191 He argues that while privacy in 
shared living arrangements is already attenuated (because, for instance, a co-occupant can 
effectively consent to search if the other is absent), the risks of evidence destruction and 
domestic violence are high.192 
Again, whether or not one agrees with the outcome in Randolph, what is clear from the 
opinions is that  the “conservative” block’s adheres to a balancing jurisprudence that de-
emphasizes individual privacy by juxtaposing supposedly minor impositions with great (even if 
speculative) social harms.  This fully comports with the decisions arising out of Hudson and 
Samson.
C.  Samson and Hudson:  Implications Going Forward 
 Aside from the very real concerns about the Court’s doctrinal shift on privacy and 
autonomy in the “regular” criminal context, Samson and Hudson offer clues about the Court’s 
direction in the coming “new generation” of cases that go beyond the traditional boundaries of 
 
190 Id. at 1533. 
191 Id. at 1536-37. 
192 Id. 
49
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.193 Such emerging issues include the warrantless wiretapping 
of American-based telephone users by national intelligence agencies,194 suspicionless searches of 
individuals on public transportation,195 new methods of internet surveillance,196 the increasing 
use of public surveillance cameras,197 data mining,198 and so forth.  While many of these cases 
will hinge on areas of law apart from pure Fourth Amendment reasonableness calculations, all of 
them will require the Court (or lower courts looking for Supreme Court guidance on the issue) to 
make fundamental determinations about the proper balance between personal privacy and 
autonomy and the interests of government in law enforcement.  Courts will have to make, even if 
just implicitly, a determination about the values underlying the Fourth Amendment’s basic 
command that all searches and seizures be “reasonable,” and will have to apply specific rules and 
tests to make such determinations.  Samson and Hudson offer a compelling preview of a majority 
of the new Court’s attitude on the fundamental “reasonableness” calculus common to all these 
issues.  Given the Court’s formulation of the balancing test, the government’s interest will almost 
always seem more compelling when the threat of violence or the loss of evidence is at stake,199 
193 See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 279, 279 (2005) 
(arguing that the collection of digital evidence requires a new conception of criminal procedure jurisprudence). 
194 David Stout, “Judge Orders End to Warrantless Wiretapping,” The New York Times, August 17, 2006 at A1; 
see David Alan Jordan, Decrypting the Fourth Amendment:  Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced 
Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice over Internet Protocol, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 505 (2006) (exploring 
the legal issues surrounding the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program).  
195 Timothy Williams and Sewell Chan, “In New Security Move, New York Police to Search Commuters’ 
Bags,” The New York Times, July 21, 2005 at A1. 
196 Declan McCullach, “FBI Plans New Net-Tapping Push,” CNet News.com, July 7, 2006, available at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6091942.html. 
197 Judy Keen, “Daley Wants Security Cameras at Bars,” USA Today, Feb. 14, 2006.   
198 Mark Clayton, “US Plans Massive Data Sweep,”  The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 9, 2006.   
199 Kamisar, supra n.124, at  486-87 (discussing the skew of the Court’s balancing test in the context of the 
exclusionary rule:  “The ‘costs’ of the exclusionary rule are immediately apparent--the ‘freeing’ of a ‘plainly guilty’ 
drug dealer --but the "benefits" of the rule are hard to grasp. One could say that the benefits ‘involve safeguarding a 
zone of dignity and privacy for every citizen, controlling abuses of power [and] preserving checks and balances.’  
And one could regard these goals as ‘pretty weighty benefits, perhaps even invaluable ones.’  But the Court has not 
done so. Instead, it has viewed the benefits of the rule "as abstract [and] speculative.”  On the other hand, the Court 
has underscored what it thinks are the severe costs of the rule. Thus, it has called the rule a ‘drastic measure,’ an 
‘extreme sanction,’ a rule that "exacts a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case," 
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and the imposition on a given individual (which oftentimes will be one who is clearly guilty of 
something) will almost always seem small by comparison.  
 Going forward, petitioners seeking to challenge government actions using Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness-type arguments will have to go above and beyond, as it were, to 
show that the challenged intrusion outweighs the law enforcement benefits, because at least five 
members of the high Court,200 including its newest members Justice Alito and Chief Justice 
Roberts, can be expected to default to the position that the government’s law enforcement 
interests usually trumps that of the individual’s interest in privacy, dignity, and autonomy.  This 
is especially true given that this “new generation” of cases will present issues of personal privacy 
and dignity not well embedded in the constitutional tradition.  Does a person give up the right not 
to be filmed by government security cameras when he goes out into public?  Are random 
searches of commuters’ bags reasonable given the grave threat of terrorism?  Does a person give 
up the right not to be “data mined” if they voluntarily share information on the Internet?  The 
answers are not obvious given current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.   However, given the 
conservative block’s formulation of the “reasonableness” inquiry in more “core” Fourth 
Amendment cases like Samson, Hudson, and Randolph, one can expect that petitioners seeking 
to expand the amendment’s protections into new realms will have a heavy, perhaps 
insurmountable, burden. 
Conclusion 
and one whose application is "contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice.") 
(citations omitted). 
200 While Justice Ginsburg joined in the Samson decision, it is questionable whether she fully supports the 
“conservative” block’s Fourth Amendment inclinations as described here. 
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Much has been – and will be – written about the Supreme Court’s opening salvo against 
the exclusionary rule in Hudson.201 However, a true accounting of the Roberts Court’s initial 
forays into the broader Fourth Amendment realm cannot be had without accounting for Samson 
as well.  Taken together, a broader jurisprudence begins to appear in focus, and lessons for future 
petitioners can be gleaned.  In the crudest measure, the Roberts Court came down strongly in 
favor of the government in its first term Fourth Amendment cases, four decisions to one.  And as 
to that one case decided against the government, Randolph, at least one commentator has 
questioned the precedential force of the decision going forward given the majority opinion’s 
narrow scope and the existing exceptions to the consent requirement.202 Going forward, 
challenges to government action in the Fourth Amendment context will have a high hurdle to 
overcome, because the presumption exists among at least five members of the Court that the 
governmental interest in law enforcement (specifically crime prevention and evidence gathering) 
will usually trump the individual interest in privacy.  This “thumb on the scale” method of 
constitutional adjudication de-emphasizes the individual’s right to a certain sphere of privacy, 
autonomy, or dignity that cannot be (or at least should not be) constitutionally invaded without a 
warrant.  This government-preferred formulation will play a large role in the “next generation” 
Fourth Amendment cases sure to come before the Roberts Court in the near future, each of which 
 
201 See, e.g., Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, supra n.87, at 283-84;   Fourth Amendment – 
Exclusionary Rule – Knock and Announce Violations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 173, 182-183 (2006) (“The question 
remains whether, having laid the groundwork, the Court will actually get rid of the exclusionary rule . . . [i]t remains 
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M. Bradley, Mixed Messages on the Exclusionary Rule, 42-DEC Trial 56 (2006) (“The better way to have handled 
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Court has put itself in the disreputable position of solemnly declaring a Fourth Amendment right and then inviting 
police officers to violate it, while providing no realistic remedy for violations.”). 
202 Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things, supra n.87, at 292.  (“The holding of Justice 
Souter’s majority opinion is so narrowly drawn that it will apply only to a handful of cases every year . . . [t]he real 
world impact of Randolph is exceedingly slight . . .”). 
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require the Court to balance an individual’s privacy interests with the government’s desire to 
conduct searches or surveillance on less-than probable cause.203 
Wrangling over these issues is not new; all of this is merely a recasting of the 
ever-present “freedom versus security” argument that is, in a certain sense, the 
fundamental issue of  governance, politics, and law.  Neither are these issues new in the 
context of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment/criminal procedure jurisprudence.  
Much has been written about the Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ retrenchment of 
Warren-era expansion of constitutional protections for criminals and the accused.204 
What is most important at this juncture is that the Roberts Court, in just its first term, 
has signaled clearly where it stands on the issue of personal autonomy and privacy when 
those values conflict with law enforcement prerogatives.  Justice Breyer had it half right 
in Hudson when he said that “[t]he majority’s “substantial social costs” argument is an 
argument against the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary principle itself.”205 The truth is 
more broad; the conservative block’s balancing test is an argument against a strong 
Fourth Amendment in general.  Whether this tilt will carry over into other areas of law, 
both within the traditional Fourth Amendment sphere and without, remains to be seen.   
 
203 See section III(C), supra.
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procedure jurisprudence.). 
205 Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2177 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
